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WHAT MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW CAN TEACH US: 
A UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE 
Donald N. Zillman' 
A quarter century ago, any comparative criminal law in the United States tended 
to treat the federal criminal justice system as the model for other systems (state, 
military, Indian tribal). The fifty state systems handled the vast majority of 
criminal cases. They were reforming both their adherence to federal constitutional 
protections for the accused and their administrative organization. Criminal justice 
had become a large volume business and old "horse and buggy'' practices could 
not keep up with the workload. 
Military criminal law, vintage 1967, seemed even more behind the times. 
Several of the perceived essentials of modern criminal justice were missing from 
the military system. The protections of the American Bill of Rights1 were applied 
haphazardly. The growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War was thoroughly 
colouring all judgments of military criminal law. Comparative studies of military 
law and federal civilian criminal law focused on how the military system could 
become more like the civilian. The whole could be summed up as the title of a 
popular book, "Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music." 
A quarter century later, comparative study is much more fruitful and balanced. 
The civilian justice system in the United States (federal or state) is no longer the 
ideal to be blindly emulated. The military justice system has changed, and it has 
many valuable insights to offer the other criminal systems in Canada and the 
United States. 
Military law in the United States is older than the Constitution.2 One of the 
frrst acts of the Continental Congress was the adoption of the British Articles of 
War to govern the new Continental Army.3 The Constitution of 1787 recognized 
that the new Congress had the power to "make rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.'"' This provision clearly envisioned that 
one set of those rules would be a criminal code to govern the armed forces. 
Congress enacted separate codes for the Army and Navy and periodically renewed 
them over the next 150 years. American military criminal jurisprudence grew out 
'Dean and Edward Godfrey Professor, University of Maine School of Law. Dean Zillman served 
briefly as a public defender and on the staff of the Arizona Attorney-General's office. He has four 
years of active service in the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps and ten years of reserve duty. 
1United States Constitution, Bill of Rights, U.S.C.S. Constitution, Amendment 9. 
2United States Constitution, U.S.C.S. Constitution, Art. I-VII [hereinafter Constitution]. 
3Diary of Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress (1905), val. 2 at 111 (30 June 1 nS). 
4Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
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of these codes and the regulations, judicial decisions and expert commentary which 
followed. 
Following World War ll, military criminal law underwent one of its greatest 
transformations. In line with the consolidation of all armed forces into the 
Department of Defence, Congress adopted a Unifonn Code of Military Justice. 5 
The same criminal statutes would govern soldiers, sailors, marines, and Air Force 
personnel.6 The new Code also made the military one more like civilian criminal 
codes than had previously been the case. The major changes were in criminal 
procedure rather than in the definition of criminal acts. As to the latter, the Code 
continued the prior practice of punishing both common criminal acts (homicide, 
robbery, rape, etc.) and distinctly military crimes (disobedience of orders, mutiny, 
sleeping on 
. 
guard duty, hazarding a vessel and so forth) . 
A major change from old codes to the new UCMJ was the lessening of the 
criminal justice system as an instrument of the military command. American 
military justice and virtually any military justice system struggles with the 
appropriate role of the commander. On the one hand, criminal misconduct in 
general and the performance of the individual soldier or sailor in the specific, are 
matters of great concern to the military commander. Command is the effective 
use of personnel to achieve the military mission. The military commander bears 
far more direct responsibility for the failure of subordinates than almost any other 
leader in society. The captain whose ship runs aground or the brigade commander 
whose unit is ambushed, gains little sympathy by claiming that subordinates 
"screwed up." He or she will be reminded, in no uncertain terms, that it is the 
commander's job to see that subordinates do not "screw up." Under these 
circumstances, it is not unusual that a commander's instinct is to be concerned 
about any criminal misconduct among the troops under his or her command. This 
concern can extend to such essentials as determining if the accused committed the 
criminal act and the appropriate punishment. At the extreme, this could make the 
commander (often acting through subordinates), investigating officer, prosecutor, 
judge, jury, and corrections officer. 
At the other extreme is the system in which military command is totally 
removed from the accused during the criminal process. In this system, federal 
civilian prosecutors, judges, and juries would investigate and adjudicate the 
criminal offence. Alternatively, the military criminal law system could remove the 
commander from the process replacing him or her with independent military 
prosecutors, defence counsel, and· judges. The criminal investigation and 
1b.e Uniform Code of Military Justice is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1992) [hereinafter UCMJ).
6Laws of the United States, c. 169, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 64 Statutes at Large 107 et seq. (1950). 
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adjudication would proceed with the soldier's commander as no more than an 
interested by-stander. 
The objection to command control has been the lack of fairness to the 
individual accused. The widespread exposure of once-and-future civilians to 
military justice during World War II doomed excessive command involvement. 
The UCMJ and its amendments in 1968 created a model that moved in the 
direction of greater individual rights to the accused at the expense of command 
control. The system that exists in 1992 continues to give the( commander 'powers 
over the criminal process, significantly the ability to bring a criminal prosecution 
and define some of the terms under which it shall be adjudicated. It provides 
military defence counsel and judges, at the trial and appellate levels, with almost 
full independence of the accused's military commander. Also, it provides specific 
prohibitions of things a commander may not do to prejudice the judicial process. 
While the names and procedures· may be different,· the current military felony trial 
would be easily recognizable to anyone familiar with Anglo-American criminal 
jurisprudence. 
The process begins with the filing of charges, typically by the victim, the 
commander of the accused, or a military police official.7 The charges are acted 
upon by a military commander who performs some of the functions of the civilian 
prosecutor.8 The more serious the offence,· the more high ranking the 
commander who may convene the court-martial.9 At the felony level, the 
commander is typically a general officer and often the commander of the 
installation. The commander, after investigation, has the civilian prosecutor's 
range of options including the following: dismissing the charges, referring the 
matter to a higher level of command, or initiating court-martial proceedings.10 
While the commander is the statutorily responsible officer, much of the actual 
processing of charges and the recommendations to prosecute come from the 
commander's legal staff.u 
Unless the parties request trial by military judge alone, the commander will 
convene the court-martial by. appointing a military judge, trial [prosecution] and 
7 . UCMJ, Art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830. 
8UCMJ, Arts. 32-35, 10 u.s.c. §§ 832-35 require the investigation of charges before submission to a 
general court-martial, the legal advice of the staff judge advocate, and the service of charges on the 
accused. 
9UCMJ, Arts. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24. Se~ also, UCMJ, Arts. 18-20, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20 which spell 
out the jurisdiction of general, special, and summary courts-martial. 
10Rules for Courts-Martial 401, Manual for Courts-Martial, 11-33 (1984). The President's power to 
prescribe court-martial rules is spelled out in UCMJ, Art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836. 
11Attorney members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps. 
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defence counsel, and by naming members of the court.12 In current practice, 
both the. judge and the defence counsel are members of separate command 
structures from the convening authority. The goal is to avoid even the appearance 
of prejudice to the defendant. 
The court-martial proceeds like the civilian trial. The defendant may plead 
guilty, typically by means of a plea bargain, 13 the prosecution and defence put 
forth their evidence and witnesses are examined and cross-examined. 
Constitutional rules regarding search and seizure and statements of the accused 
are applicable. At the conclusion, the fact finder reaches a judgment as to 
whether the charges are proven.14 If they are, he or she then sets the appropriate 
penalty. Following the completion of the court-martial, the convening officer may 
modify the punishment in favour of the accused or remit it altogether .15 In this 
situation, the commander has a clemency power similar to that of a state governor, 
which can be exercised for a good reason or for no reason at all.16 
After command review of the court-martial is complete, and if the accused's 
conviction stands, the appellate process begins. The seriousness of the fmdings 
determines the appeal process. Where the sentence is discharge from the service 
or imprisonment for one year or more, the accused is guaranteed reassessment at 
the Court of Military Review of his/her serviceP The Courts of Military Review 
are usually composed of senior military legal officers. Typically, the defendant will 
be represented by new counsel who specializes in appellate criminal work. 
A further discretionary review is available from the "Supreme Court of the 
Military." This is the United States Court of Military Appeals created in the 
UCM/. 18 By statutory requirement, the members of the Court of Military 
Appeals are civilians, not uniformed military members. The sceptic of military 
justice will probably be disappointed to fmd much similarity between civilian and 
military criminal law. Yet points of difference do exist and an examination of 
these points will provide valuable lessons to the civilian justice system. 
12 UCMJ, Arts. 25-27, 10 U.S.C. §§ 825-27. 
13Rules for Couns-Manial910, Manual for Couns-Manial, 11-117. 
14UCMJ, Arts. 51-52, 10 U.S.C. §§ 851-52. 
15ucMJ, Art. 60, 10 u.s.c. § 860. 
16/bid. at 60(c)(l), 10 U.S.C. § 860, "The authority under this section to modify the findings and 
sentence .. .is a matter of command prerogative involving the sole direction of the convening authority." 
17UCMJ, Art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866. 
18Art. 67, 10 u.s.c. § 867. 
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The military criminal law experience over the last 20 years offers some usefj.Il 
bases of comparison with civilian criminal justice. In general, military justice has 
grown in popular esteem, while civilian criminal law has been ·increasingly 
criticized. Military justice has generally benefitted from the reforms of the 
Vietnam era. The full recognition of the military judge and the independence of 
defence counsel from command influence, have removed two of the perceived 
deficiencies of the old system. The continued improvement of the military 
appellate system has allowed for the correction of inevitable trial errors. Also, the 
development of an all-volunteer force, with high entry and retention standards, has 
ended some of the problems created by including unproductive and unmilitary 
persons in the ranks. 
Assessment of any criminal justice system can be based on a number of 
questions which measure of performance. Among them are the following: 
Does the system accurately assess guilt? 
Does the system provide the accused with the rights promised to even the 
guilty person under the Constitution and laws? 
Does the system provide appropriate support for victims and others harmed 
by criminal activity? ' 
Does the system encourage the correction of the convicted criminal? 
Does the system achieve its objectives with the most efficient expenditure of 
public wealth? 
I cannot answer these questions with certainty. However, I will present some 
features of the military criminal justice system which provide potential answers 
deserving study by the reformers of civilian systems. 
The first feature is the involvement of the commander. While reforms have 
properly removed the commander from involvement with individual guilt 
determinations, military criminal law remains commander-focused. He or she 
convenes the proceedings, receives reports from the legal and police experts about 
the state of wrongdoing in the command, and exercises a considerable post­
conviction clemency power. 
The civilian system has no equivalent to the conmander. The prosecuting 
attorney is in a largely adversarial role with the accused. The mayor or governor 
offers little that makes him or her the employer-supervisor figure. Typically, the 
politician's role is to rail against crime rather than to undertake serious efforts to 
control it. The civilian structure of government may place much of the 
responsibility for crime and punishment on attorneys general and district attorneys 
who are independent from the mayor or governor of their jurisdictions (or even 
of a separate political party). Civilian responsibility for crime is thus fragmented. 
With everyone to blame, there is no one to blame. 
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The second feature is the specialized nature of the criminal legal profession 
in the military. At the larger installations criminal work is handled by criminal 
justice professionals. The prosecutor and the defence counsel are equivalent to 
civilian district attorneys and public defenders. Criminal law is their primary or 
entire workload. The generalist handling the occasional criminal case is largely 
absent from the military. As well, the military judge is a criminal specialist, not 
a judicial generalist. The military has no separate judicial control over non­
criminal matters as is common in civilian spheres. The military judge is drawn 
from the ranks of military criminal lawyers. Judgeship becomes the next and often 
final stage of a military professional career that may take the officer to his or her 
fifties or sixties. A new military judge is often younger than his or her civilian 
counterpart, but rarely comes to the bench without substantial familiarity with 
criminal law and practice. The new civilian jurist may reach the bench without any 
exposure to criminal practice. The military judge may also fmd greater incentives 
towards a career in judging than the civilian. The military jurist does not face re­
elections or wages well below that of some civilian contemporaries. 
Professionalization extends to the military appellate process as well. The work 
of the "Supreme Court of the Military'' is solely criminal. Appeals are automatic 
and experienced appellate counsel are available to challenge any failings of the 
defence counsel. The military jurists of the Courts of Military Review come to 
their appellate assignment with considerable criminal justice experience. Civilian 
judges of the Court of Military Appeals without such experience fmd it soon 
develops. 
A third feature of the military justice system involves the treatment of the 
victim. In recent decades, civilian criminal law has begun to recognize that crime 
victims may be damaged by the legal system after they have been damaged by the 
criminal. Civilian efforts to improve the situation have been sporadic and often 
thwarted by budgetary and constitutional considerations. The military may do 
better. While the UCMJ provides no victims' rights section, the structure of the 
military is likely to give support and comfort to a victim who is a military member 
or dependent. Free medical and counselling care· is available. Military claims 
statutes may recompense some criminal harms. Lastly, the military community is 
likely to side frrmly with the victim. 
A fourth feature of the military justice system is its potential for rehabilitation 
of the convicted. The civilian "corrections systems" appear to be doing little 
correction. The system has little to ·offer ·the convict who truly desires to better 
him or herself. The military, at least, offers rehabilitation within the system. The 
offender who has not been discharged may anticipate a return to the service after 
completion of sentence. In practice, however, the shrinking size of the force 
makes it unlikely that a convicted felon will be retained for a further enlistment. 
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The military criminal justice system has improved over the years, but it 
remains short of perfection. Nonetheless, it provides profitable areas of study in 
criminal justice. I would not urge its complete adoption in the civilian sphere. · 
Each system should be tailored to the distinct constituencies it serves. I would 
recommend that civilian systems examine features of the military system that have 
worked well. Possibly, the lessons learned in the military can stimulate reform in 
the civilian system, especially in those areas that demand improvement. 
HeinOnline -- 42 U.N.B.L.J. 235 1993
